Let’s be clear, I am not an expert on Ukraine and so this Blood Rep isn’t going to be yet another ‘hot take’ on the crisis. For those wanting proper ‘hot takes’ by bonafide experts go to the end of this piece and click on the suggested threads or links. However, I can claim some expertise dealing with conflict, civil wars and insurgencies and their security implications. This Blood Rep is an analysis of worst case scenarios involving foreign fighters and insurgency beyond the romanticism, idealism and the emotional pull that such conflicts understandably evoke within the soul of Man.
As such, since lives are at stake here, something should be said about the statements of Liz Truss, the British Foreign Secretary, and her support of young British men going to fight in Ukraine1. Her statements had immediate political reverberations. President Putin used her statements as an excuse to put Russia’s nuclear forces on ‘special alert’.
Apart from revealing Truss’s inexperience on the world stage, her statements do have domestic policy implications too, not just in terms of the law. Dominic Grieve, former Attorney General to David Cameron, has already said that such an action would breach the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 which makes it illegal for anyone to enlist in a foreign army at war with a country at peace with the UK. It is true that this is a somewhat antiquated law, but it still opens up a whole host of questions.
Let’s set aside the messy question of British, mostly Muslim, foreign fighters who joined Jihadist groups in Syria who were jailed either in the UK or detained in northern Syria. The state viewed them as being ideologically ‘different’ from the West if they espoused an Islamist ideology that view the West as hostile towards the Muslim world. It is clear that those British men going to fight in Ukraine don’t harbour such anti-Western views and are different.
But there are questions regarding British Kurds and/or British foreign fighters who joined Kurdish factions, and others who were jailed going to fight against ISIS: their values are in line with British foreign policy aims as indeed were many of the British Muslims who joined the FSA to fight against Assad in the early stages of the Syrian uprising. But even so arguably, there are clear differences between joining the Ukrainian army and the YPG, since the latter is an offshoot of a listed terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, the statements are deeply problematic from a domestic and international policy perspective. It lays the British government open to the charge of double standards and hypocrisy, even if that may not be the case.
But there are deeper issues at play that Truss may not have seen and should be considered seriously. And this is what I will try to to deal with here.
This Blood Rep aims to analyse the Ukrainian crisis as a corpse on an autopsy slab. It does not take any sides, makes no moral judgements and tries to approach the issue like a surgeon. The Blood Rep also imagines worst case scenarios. It brings in experiences from messy conflicts like Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and others and asks you to consider some of these uncomfortable questions that Truss’ statements might lead to (even if they have been modified by Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace)2.
Now, of course, it could be argued that each conflict is different. Ukraine is societally and culturally different from- say- Syria or Afghanistan or even a close neighbour such as Hungary of the 1960s. Granted they are; however human nature has changed little over time and neither has war or Realpolitik in human societies. So this is the lens I will adopt when considering Truss’ support of British young men joining the Ukrainian caravan. What follows are a continuum of worst case scenarios: (a) when the Ukrainian state is relatively intact and able to sustain its resistance (b) Ukrainian State becomes a shadow state or wins (c) Russian conquest and occupation.
Scenario 1: When Ukrainian State Is Intact And Is Able To Sustain Its Resistance
Foreign Fighters3 can be a liability if left unchecked and untrained, even more so if numbers are as large as President Zelensky claims4. Whilst many are well intentioned, some are no doubt fleeing their own personal problems and may bring those problems to the front. There may be others who are ideologically motivated as was the case of the Internationalist Brigades that joined the Spanish civil war in the 1930s. Now, this is what happened with many Salafist fighters who went to Syria to ‘help the Syrian people’. However, what the Syrians did not realise was that help from these foreign jihadis confused the objectives of the uprising. For the foreign jihadi helping Syrians meant establishing the Shariah, Islamic law; for Syrians, help meant removing President Bashar Assad. Assad in turn used the presence of these foreign fighters not only to play the terrorist card but also to rally the minorities to support his government.
The key here will be how the Ukrainian military integrates them. If these foreign fighters are not integrated properly they can become a liability as they became in the Syrian conflict and remain so. For the current HTS leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the fear of foreign fighters was a political asset in the past; now their presence in his territory is a political liability and hampers his quest for legitimacy. The international community uses the threat of foreign fighters as a means of keeping him out of the international political stage.
Fear or threat, it should be added, can be a great political asset as the Taliban and indeed the YPG, has shown. Both have deployed it effectively in their political aims. In the case of HTS some foreign fighters have become a law onto themselves and we should not think that this situation cannot occur in countries like Ukraine. Of course this depends very much on how long the Ukrainian state can maintain its integrity and keep these foreign fighters in check, but the longer the conflict goes on or its mechanisms begin to deteriorate, the more it opens itself up to the same issues that Jolani is experiencing with his foreign fighters, especially as the Ukrainian military has battalions linked to oligarchs, political parties and right-wing groups; now although these battalions have been incorporated into the National Guard this process is relatively recent, and it would not be surprising that under the strain of war these battalions become more independent and revert back to their original conception: independent militias. It is in such circumstances the presence of foreign fighters can prove to be immensely damaging and turn into roving mercenary bandit battalions that set up check points ad hoc to terrorise the population in the name of the resistance. This can be utilised by Russia to employ more draconian measures against the Ukrainian population.
Integration can be achieved even in times of stress, in the Spanish civil war, most Internationalists who joined were ideologically motivated and integrated into the Spanish Republican side as the civil war progressed. However, we should ask ourselves the question in the case of Ukraine, what sort of foreign fighter will turn up? Now, the Ukrainian army has already said that it is vetting its volunteers and that “Nazis and jihadists are strictly prohibited, we understand it’s a disaster for our image if the wrong people come”. But in the current climate, given the rise of Far-right groups in Europe, many with Far-right sympathies will inevitably slip through the vetting process. After all, Europe has seen a trend in the rise of Far-right sympathies and it would not be unreasonable to assume that many volunteers that go will harbour some of those feelings that are not fully developed. That is probably the case with countries such as Austria and Hungary which have historical ties with Ukraine. The latter once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian empire, both having a strong Far-right electorate. In Hungary, Ukraine’s nearest neighbour, the ruling party Fidesz led by Viktor Orbán received 49 percent of the vote peddling the idea that his country is the last bastion of Europe holding the Muslims at bay5. It would be unsurprising that Hungarians might go in spite of Orbán’s vague position on the Russian invasion, to defend Europe. These Far-right sentiments, as history has shown, could become far more pronounced as the war becomes increasingly brutal.
So it begs the question: do we want to see Far-right foreign fighters going to Ukraine in order to ‘defend’ Europe? It might give Far-right groups combat experience and embolden them further and, if the Ukrainian state falls apart under massive Russian military pressure (a real possibility), these groups could become a law onto themselves either there or when they return. They could become a sort of Freikorps that return to Europe, grizzled, adept in fighting and disgruntled; feeling that they were let down by their soft effeminate Western leaders in Ukraine.
Neither should we dismiss those with Far-left sympathies joining the fight. So far it has been mostly from this group that have gone and joined the YPG in Northern Syria6. And it would not be unreasonable to assume that a contingent like that will also go to Ukraine to fight Russian ‘fascism’. Not only will this cause immense tension between the foreign fighters due to their opposing ideological sympathies but it could result in splintering and lack of discipline as we have seen in Syria between various Islamist groups precisely due to their ideological differences. At home we may see a return to Left-wing groups not unsimilar to the Red Brigades of Italy.
There is another small group of foreign fighters that may go over there too as it presents an opportunity. The Muslim jihadist motivated by revenge for Syria, Chechnya and other past grievances against Russia might capitalise on the fact that such an action is deemed heroic and is perfectly sanctioned by the Western powers. Can Ukrainian officials distinguish between French Muslim Chechens going to Ukraine to fight Jihad or gain revenge against the Russians who expelled their fathers; and the average Jihadi who wants to fulfil his pipe dream, gain combat experience and then return to Europe to sow terror on the continent? Such a scenario is not so absurd if you consider that there are already Chechens and other Muslim Ukrainians fighting against the Russians and many diaspora Chechens are already travelling to Ukraine thirsty for revenge. What the presence of Jihadists in Ukraine means for Europe is something we can already imagine.
Moreover, for the Western powers there is an additional problem. The capture of Western foreign fighters will put a strain on blood and treasure. For example, if US foreign fighters are captured by Russians, it could spark off local military conflicts where American special forces are deployed to rescue them. The consequences could be a waste of valuable military human resources since special forces are now being deployed in more unconventional ways7. We have already had near misses when US commandos had a four hour fire fight with the Wagner group, Russian mercenaries, in Syria. However, whilst the latter can be contained, US special forces in Ukraine could lead to further escalation of tension between the two nuclear powers. Foreign Western intervention in Ukraine which Russians consider to be a part of their historical patrimony, could result in poisoning further East-West relations as early foreign interventions in the 20th century did.
Moreover, such incidents could be used as a propaganda tool for President Putin to justify his invasion especially if it gets mired in difficulty. Such issues can and have been exploited in the past. Consider the U-2 affair when an American spy plane was shot down by the USSR in 1960. It was a massive embarrassment for the US and a propaganda coup for the USSR.
Scenario 2: Ukrainian State Becomes A Shadow State Or Wins
If the Ukrainian state is unable to maintain a shadow state under Russian occupation or invasion, then we could see the emergence of warlords and the growth of criminal elements utilising foreign fighters and the networks they have in Europe. This has already occurred after the break up of Yugoslavia, when Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević utilised criminal elements to achieve his political aims, which led to an industrial scale drug production and smuggling, something Europe is still struggling with today8. Similarly, it was these Serbian criminal elements that helped European Jihadist networks to achieve their aims in assassinating Ahmad Shah Massoud in Afghanistan in 2001. As Marvin Kalb notes the Ukrainian military is not a homogenous organisation but funded by oligarchs and individuals setting themselves up for corruption. And so a scenario where we have criminals and warlords emerging is not something exclusive to underdeveloped (or less ‘civilised’) countries. Rather such scenarios occur in all human societies that break down to their most elemental; in such cases man finds security in strength and foreign fighters are often used and manipulated by the strong man for their own ends. So where do foreign fighters fit in in the calculation? The story of Ali Manasfi is illustrative of this point here. Ali Manasfi was a British-Syrian foreign fighter, one of the earliest foreign fighters in Syria. In Syria, the young man who left school at fourteen, having lived the gang life, became celebrated as ‘a lion’ despite being relatively uneducated in the faith. He ended up training many of the foreign fighters who later joined ISIS committing some of the worst human rights violations in Syria. Here the warlords of the Syrian conflict used his talents and he spent his life serving many masters from the Nusra Front, ISIS, to Jund al-Aqsa to mention a few, before he was killed.
And so the longer the conflict goes on, the greater the risk for Europe. Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelensky may have had little choice in distributing arms to the populace but such actions have consequences. Criminal elements will no doubt see this as an opportunity for pursuing their own criminal enterprise. And once the integrity and shape of the Ukrainian military disappears, everyone becomes a ‘defender of Ukraine’. If institutions weaken and they cannot maintain a shadow state, then this may result in everything from roving militias to breakaway principalities where foreign fighters are used, as in the case of Ali Manasfi, to manipulate and tip the balance of power in favour of one faction or another as has happened in Syria, except of course this is right next door to Europe.
Even if the Ukrainian state survives the Russian onslaught, Ukraine may become a prisoner to these armed men who defended the state. Syria for instance is a good example, it has turned into a narco-state as President Assad has relied on paramilitary leaders to keep the state afloat. These men have now cashed in their reward for loyalty and become some of the biggest exporters of Captagon drugs in the world9.
Scenario 3: Russian Conquest And Occupation
If the Russian state takes over Ukraine or installs its own puppet leader- that has massive security consequences. Foreign fighters will return to Europe. They will be changed, men are changed by war, especially asymmetric warfare, and may view the world differently and perhaps even their fellow Europeans differently. Now, it maybe that nothing comes of it, there are Syrian militiamen who committed unspeakable crimes against the Syrian population who live outwardly normal lives in European cities and that’s how it may play out or they may see themselves as a vanguard, as better- this sense of entitlement may result in the rejuvenation of Far-right elements in Europe.
Moreover, the Russian state, might seek to displace what it sees as undesirable Ukrainian elements, by employing factions that ultimately cause instability and weaken the state further and have bigger consequences. Italy is a great example of that: the US made deals with the guappos or criminal outlaws in Naples and southern Italy to help with the US invasion during the Second World War. Later with the threat of Communism it was these same guappos that were relied on to expel the Communists from Italian society allowing them to flourish and evolve into the organised crime syndicates of the Neapolitan Camorra or the Sicilian Mafia weakening the Italian state and impacting Europe with its brazen criminality.
What happens to the Ukrainian resistance if the country is conquered? Where will they go? Just like in Syria, one suspects they will go to Europe and if they do, the neighbouring countries may have a similar security situation as the Turks do with its Jihadist factions. These countries may, at first, allow the border regions to have houses where Ukrainians and foreign fighters can form their battalions at great political risk to itself, it may use these forces to harass and keep the Russians busy in Ukraine. Or it may seek to dilute and disperse these fighting elements by settling them in various European countries. The question then arises how do you maintain and keep an eye on people with all sorts of sympathies from former Nazi Azov battalion members to just the ordinary resistance fighter who is suffering from PTSD let alone the average Western foreign fighter that signed up. Will this result in brutalised fighters, now civilians venting their frustrations at Russian embassies all over Europe as we saw in the case of Muslim Europeans targeting US embassies in Europe in the early 2000s? There are no easy answers for any state and it is better in such circumstances for the likes of Truss and others to calibrate her statements in the near future and discourage the movement of young men wishing to fight in Ukraine.
Threads And Other Materials
Here are some materials I thought were interesting, some are contrarian and apologies if they offend people’s sensibilities but we are all grown ups:
Michael Kofman, Director, Russia Studies at CNA. Senior Adjunct Fellow, CNAS thread on Moscow’s miscalculation: -
Samo Burja the founder of Bismarck Analysis thread on Russia’s ability to annex territory.
Small compilation of these warnings, from Kissinger to Mearsheimer thread by Arnaud Bertrand
Thread by BBC Jihadi expert thread Mina al-Lami: on Jihadist reaction to the Ukraine crisis
Thread on how far NATO push the USSR? By Dan Altman, Assistant Professor of Political Science (International Relations) @GeorgiaStateU
China is watching the Ukrainian conflict closely thread by Tuvia Gering, Chinese security & foreign policy, China-Israel, China-Middle East, Disaster & Emergency Management @JISS_Israel
Thread by Robert Crews, history professor at Stanford on Chechens in Ukrainian conflict.
On Ukraine’s propaganda strategy thread by Peter W Singer Strategist @NewAmerica, Prof at ASU @Future_of_War and author.
On impact of Ukraine on Middle East and Gulf states thread see Hasan Alhasan, research Fellow for Middle East Policy @IISS_org, foreign policy & statecraft in the Gulf & South Asia.
Thread on stance of Arab world of Ukranian crisis by Dr H A Hellyer
John J. Mearsheimer, Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin
Lawfare Archive: Putin's Imperial Gamble:
Ben Judah, The Terrible The Terrible Truth So Many Experts Missed About Russia, Slate.com
Andrew Sparrow, Liz Truss criticised for backing Britons who wish to fight in Ukraine, The Guardian, 28 Feb 2022. See also also thread of Lizzie Dearden, Home Affairs editor of the Independent:
I understand that Truss’ statements have been modified by Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, see: ‘Don't fight in Ukraine if you are untrained, says defence secretary’, BBC News, 2 March, 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-60555451 - still note the caveat, ‘if you are untrained'.
By foreign fighter I mean your volunteer fighter and I exclude professional contractors and mercenaries. They are different and requires a separate discussion for another Blood Rep.
According to Phil Stewart, military and intelligence correspondent for Reuters, President Zelensky claims that 16 000 have volunteered to fight.
Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide, BBC News, 13 Nov, 2019. See also Daniel Boffey, Orbán claims Hungary is last bastion against 'Islamisation' of Europe, The Guardian, 18 Feb, 2018. Also ‘Hungary to stay out of Ukraine-Russia conflict, Orban says, Reuters, 27 Feb, 2022. Ukraine is a complicated matter for Orbán, for as much as he is a defender of European identity, in the case of Ukraine he has decided to prudently stay out of the conflict. Perhaps the memory of the USSR crushing the Hungarian uprising in 1958 still lingers in the calculation. Whatever the political calculation, it may not prevent ordinary Hungarians and Europeans to join the Ukrainians.
Demir Murat Seyrek, European far-left fighters in Syria: It's time to take them seriously: View, Euronews, 5 March 2018
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos Unfolded in Syria, New York Times, 24 May, 2018
Sasa Dragojlo, In Serbia, State’s Ties to Crime Become Hard to Miss, Balkan Insight, 16 Feb, 2021
Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, On Syria’s Ruins, a Drug Empire Flourishes, New York Times, 5 Dec 2021